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The rise of the “Pirate Party,” culminating in several successful showings in state 
elections, is as surprising as it is unprecedented in the history of political parties in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. It is too early to say whether the German Pirate 
Party—unlike its forerunner counterpart in Sweden—will be successful in the long 
term. From the point of view of political theory, the young party is mainly of interest 
because it campaigns not so much on a central theme but rather on the promise of re-
organizing democracy: The “LiquidFeedback” voting software is designed to involve 
the party “base” in all decision-making processes all the time. It is the party’s promise 
that the systematic and consistent use of new communication technologies will 
replace the concept of representation with a more direct democracy. It is doubtful, 
however, whether we can do without the idea of representation. Participating in 
elections and electing representatives to parliament are practices that remain bound to 
representative democracy, as does the use of LiquidFeedback itself: members may 
“delegate” their voting rights, so a prominent member at times was able to submit 167 
votes simultaneously.1  This arrangement constitutes a pragmatic solution to the 
problem of not every party member being able to vote on all issues all the time; 
                                                
1 See Becker, “Digitale Eminenz.” 
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however, it fails to deliver on the identity of “base” and “leadership.” 
From the perspective of cultural history, the call for a complete identity of 
“people” and “ruler” is the most urgent demand of modern democracy—a demand 
that invariably resists realization. The classic formulation of this strict call for a 
complete identity between ruler and ruled can be found in Rousseau’s Social Contract 
(1762), which ultimately prohibits any kind of representation of the volonté générale 
(general will). “Sovereignty … cannot be represented,” wrote Rousseau, “it lies 
essentially in the general will, and will does not admit of representation: it is either 
the same, or other; there is no intermediate possibility.”2  
Carl Schmitt made approving mention of this sentence in his Constitutional 
Theory of 1928:  
Where the people as the subject of the constitution-making power appear, the political 
form of the state defines itself by the idea of an identity. The nation is there. It need not 
and cannot be represented. This is an idea that gives Rousseau’s oft-repeated arguments 
(Contrat social, III, 15) their democratic irrefutability. (emphasis in the original)3 
In this perspective, the desire for the identity of the people as ruling subject and ruled 
object is the core of democracy; this desire contradicts the principle of 
“representation” which entails a dictatorial separation of ruler and ruled. “The 
absolute monarchy is, in fact, only absolute representation,” wrote Schmitt.4 
So far, scholars have paid only little attention to the fact that the democratic 
critique of the principle of representation was first formulated in the context of a 
religious discourse, that is, the Protestant critique of Catholicism.5 There exists no 
                                                
2 Rousseau, The Social Contract & Discourses, 83. 
3 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 239.  
4 Ibid. 
5 See Hamacher, “Skizze zu einem Vortrag über Demokratie,” 7. 
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systematic study of the link between Protestantism and democracy—although this 
link was, in fact, a central theme of nineteenth-century historical analyses. In 1802, 
the French officer, travel writer and philosopher Charles François Dominique de 
Villers received a prize from the Académie Français for his Essay on the Spirit and 
the Influence of the Reformation of Luther.6 In this essay, Villers argued that his 
contemporaries owed their increase in political freedom directly to the influence of 
Luther’s reformation. “The Reformation then, which at first was a recurrence to 
liberty only in religious things, became … a recurrence to liberty in political things 
also,” he wrote.7 Postulating a direct link between the French Revolution and the 
religious upheaval in sixteenth-century Germany, he asked: “[M]ay not the French 
revolution be considered as a remote but necessary consequence of the 
Reformation?”8 
A few years later, Hegel provided a similar assessment. In his Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy, he posited that it was with Luther’s Reformation that “this 
principle of Christian freedom is first presented and brought to a true consciousness”9; 
this emphasis on the Reformation as the discovery of a new freedom, in fact, led him 
to declare that it “was in the Lutheran Reformation that the great revolution 
appeared.”10 The Reformation here appears as a revolutionary principle that ushers in 
modernity as a whole. In his lectures on The Philosophy of History, Hegel talked 
emphatically about “Christian Freedom,” which in his opinion “is actualized” in 
Luther’s teachings: “In the proclamation of these principles is unfurled the new, the 
                                                
6 See Graf, Der Protestantismus, 93. 
7 Villers, An Essay on the Spirit and Influence of the Reformation of Luther, 186. 
8 Ibid., 190–91. 
9 Hegel, Lectures on The History of Philosophy, 149. 
10 Ibid., 146–47. 
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latest standard round which the peoples rally—the banner of Free Spirit, independent, 
though finding its life in the Truth and enjoying independence only in it. This is the 
banner under which we serve and which we bear.”11 
The question remains, though, what we understand by “Christian Freedom.” 
Luther’s 1520 treatise “Concerning Christian Liberty” may elucidate key links. In this 
treatise, Luther focused on the Reformation’s starting-point: his vehement rejection of 
“good works,” which for him are merely an attempt to buy one’s way into heaven.12 
On that condition, all church institutions and rituals diminish in value. No works on 
earth—no prayer, no ceremony, no church office, no pilgrimage, in short: none of the 
Catholic rituals can help attain salvation once they are exposed as calculating actions 
of a still sinful individual. “And so it [the soul] will profit nothing that the body 
should be adorned with sacred vestments, or dwell in holy places, or be occupied in 
sacred offices,” wrote Luther.13 Responding to what he sees as worthless “good 
works,” Luther postulated that faith alone—sola fide—would lead to salvation. This 
argument was made possible by his distinction between “the Law” and “the Gospel,” 
which is crucial for Luther’s interpretation of Christianity as a whole.14  
The “whole Scripture of God is divided into two parts: precepts and 
                                                
11 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 416 (italics in the original). 
12 See Luther, “Concerning Christian Liberty,” 361: “But those who pretend to be justified by works are looking … 
only to the works themselves; thinking that, if they can accomplish as many works and as great ones as possible, 
all is well with them, and they are justified.” 
13 Ibid., 346. 
14 In his New Year’s sermon of 1532 on “The Distinction between the Law and the Gospel,” Luther said: “Both of 
them are the word of God: the Law (or the Ten Commandments) and the Gospel. Both were given by God: the 
Gospel originally in Paradise, the Law on Mt. Sinai. That is why it is so important to distinguish the two words 
properly and not mingle them together. Otherwise you will not be able to have or hold on to a correct 
understanding of either of them.” See Luther, “The Distinction between the Law and the Gospel,” 153. 
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promises,” wrote Luther.15 He pointed out that the laws that God had laid down in the 
Old Testament were by no means meant to be obeyed. In Luther’s conception, the 
ethical law has the “almost diabolical characteristic”16 that it does not show the way 
to God’s salvation, but mercilessly reveals to man his inability to live without guilt. 
“Never does man commit a more terrible sin than when he starts to feel and 
comprehend the law,” he wrote.17 At the nadir of his despair about his failure to fulfill 
God’s laws, man recognizes that he cannot achieve salvation on his own—“then, 
being truly humbled and brought to nothing in his own eyes, he finds in himself no 
resource for justification and salvation.”18 It is at this very moment that “that other 
part of Scripture” comes in—the gift of salvation through faith alone in the Gospel: 
“‘Lo! believe in Christ, in whom are promised to you grace, justification, peace, and 
liberty.’ All these things you shall have, if you believe, and shall be without them, if 
you do not believe.”19 Christians cannot earn their salvation through deeds and good 
works, but they can receive it as a gift from God “that had nothing to do with their 
own sinful actions.”20 Luther sees Jesus’s words in the New Testament as a promise of 
this gift. However, abolishing the “works,” i.e. the link between salvation and good 
deeds on earth, does not mean that worldly deeds are completely irrelevant and must 
not be an “invitation to licentiousness.”21 
From God’s granting of salvation, irrespective of good works, Luther 
                                                
15 Luther, “Concerning Christian Liberty,” 349. 
16 “… geradezu diabolische Eigenschaft”; Kittsteiner, Die Entstehung des modernen Gewissens, 163. 
17 “Niemals sündigt ein Mensch schrecklicher als darin, wenn er anfängt, das Gesetz zu fühlen und zu begreifen.” 
Luther, Luther Deutsch, Vol. 4, 298. 
18 Luther, “Concerning Christian Liberty,” 349–50. 
19 Ibid., 350. 
20 MacCulloch, The Reformation, 116. 
21 Voegelin, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, Vol. 22, Vol. IV, 253. 
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concluded that the Christians were an elect people, following the Jewish tradition of 
the “chosen people.” All Christians “who believe on Christ are kings and priests in 
Christ,” he wrote.22 The idea of a universal priesthood of all believers comes from 
Judaism. When Luther quoted St. Peter—“Ye are a chosen generation, a royal 
priesthood, a holy nation, a peculiar people … (1 Pet. ii. 9)”23—he took his cue from 
the Book of Exodus: “And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy 
nation” (Exod. 19:6). It is almost an exact quotation, only the verb tense has changed: 
Whereas God’s law in the Old Testament simultaneously promises and demands the 
equality of all under the rule of God’s laws after the Israelites’ return to the Holy 
Land24, St. Peter’s statement is no longer put forward as a demand for the future, but 
for the present: The Christians are in the Holy Land here and now, because Christ has 
come down to earth. Luther tears down the boundaries between laypeople and priests 
in order to turn all people into priests (though not into laypeople). For Luther, priests 
are not simply defined by the fact that they are “worthy to appear before God”25 
(which is an aspect of salvation): in their lives on earth, they also meet the highest 
ethical standards. Luther’s treatise on liberty formulates a comprehensive program of 
self-disciplining, which is close to what Max Weber describes as “worldly 
asceticism.”26 In Weber’s words, “Sebastian Franck struck the central characteristic of 
this type of religion when he saw the significance of the Reformation in the fact that 
now every Christian had to be a monk all his life.”27 
                                                
22 Luther, “Concerning Christian Liberty,” 355. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See Walzer, Exodus and Revolution, 109. 
25 Luther, “Concerning Christian Liberty,” 356. 
26 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 120. 
27 Ibid., 121. 
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With Luther, the designation of the Christians as a “holy nation” of priests 
assumes not only ethical but also political significance, to the extent that Luther 
derives from it a vehement critique of the idea of “representation” in the context of 
church hierarchy—thus challenging this hierarchy on principle. For Luther, neither a 
bishop nor the Pope is a representative of the world beyond. “Therefore a priest 
should be nothing in Christendom but a functionary; as long as he holds his office, he 
has precedence of others; if he is deprived of it, he is a peasant or a citizen like the 
rest,” wrote Luther.28 As a “functionary,” the bishop is not a representative (of Jesus), 
but only somebody who performs a task, an office, a service in the original meaning 
of the German word Amt.29 Luther explicitly translated this definition to the political 
sphere: 
Therefore the bishop's consecration is just as if in the name of the whole congregation he 
took one person out of the community, each member of which has equal power, and 
commanded him to exercise this power for the rest; in the same way as if ten brothers, 
co-heirs as king’s sons, were to choose one from among them to rule over their 
inheritance, they would all of them still remain kings and have equal power, although 
one is ordered to govern.30 
Since this paragraph refers to the political role of the bishop, its explosive 
power for “worldly” politics becomes apparent only at second glance. The bishop 
here is not a representative of a dignitas, but merely “elected” from “out of the 
community” of equals—“each member of which has equal power”—who have 
assigned to him the task to “govern.” This assignment is not conferred by a 
                                                
28 Luther, “Address to the Christian Nobility,” 267. 
29 In its original sense, the word “Amt” means service, servitude (from the Old High German ambaht, which 
probably derives from the Celtic word ambiaktos, meaning servant, messenger). Seen this way, rule can also be 
understood as a service (the ruler as minister omnium). See Dreier, Das kirchliche Amt, 128. 
30 Luther, “Address to the Christian Nobility,” 266. 
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transcendent power, but by the community itself: They “command” one of their own 
to act “for the rest.” It seems obvious to transfer this analogy back to “worldly” 
politics: If all Christians are equal “brothers”—the political formula of “fraternity” in 
the French Revolution obviously had Christian roots—then they “remain kings and 
have equal power” also in a worldly sense and need no longer recognize a 
government they have not “chosen.” Even though Luther himself did not draw this 
conclusion, it explains the consistent affinity between the Protestant revolution and 
the political revolutions and uprisings that have accompanied it since the sixteenth 
century. The English Puritans, who beheaded King Charles I. in 1649, took their anti-
monarchical fervor largely from a Protestant re-reading of the Bible, explicitly 
applying Luther’s rejection of representation to the political sphere.31 If one follows 
Hegel (as well as Villers and others), however, the Protestant skepticism about the 
idea of representation has also inspired revolutions that no longer have any direct link 
to Protestantism. To the present day, the fundamental rejection of representation has 
remained a dynamic principle of democracy—even though a democracy without 
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